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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
 
For many years, the Baltic Sea region 
stood out for its remarkable stability. The 
dramatic changes following the end of the 
Cold War did not have a profound effect on 
the territory. However, Russia's coopera-
tion with other states in the Baltic Sea re-
gion began to lose momentum. This paper 
discusses the negative effects of the Ukrain-
ian and Syrian crises and the increasing 
tension between Russia and other countries 
in the Baltic Sea region. In the short term, 
these trends are unlikely to reverse. Of the 
two possible scenarios — suspending rela-
tions until a solution to the political and 
military problems is found or trying to make 
use of every opportunity in economy, cul-
ture, science, education, etc., — the latter is 
preferable. A breakdown in regional coop-
eration will weaken Russia’s position. 
However, gaining positive momentum may 
prove instrumental in overcoming the con-
frontation between Russia and the West in 
the future. 
 
Key words: Baltic Sea Region, Russia, 
European Union, NATO, regional coope-
ration 
 
For several decades, the Baltic Sea 
region was a peaceful and stable terri-
tory in the dramatically changing world. 
A certain balance of power existed in 
the region during the Cold War. On the 
one hand, the USSR, Warsaw, and East 
Germany were part the Warsaw Pact 
and the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance; on the other, the FRG, 
Denmark, Norway, and Iceland were 
members of NATO with the FRG and 
Denmark also being members of the 
European Economic Community. Den-
mark and Norway insisted that they 
would not host foreign troops and mili-
tary facilities during peacetime. Sweden 
and Finland were officially neutral. In 
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practice, however, Stockholm maintained close links with the US and 
NATO. After signing the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual As-
sistance with the USSR (1948), Finland was largely influenced by the Soviet 
foreign policy. Its international profile was boosted by the successful Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975), which was regarded 
as a symbol of easing tension. The situation in the region remained stable 
even in the most difficult periods of the Cold War, and the concentration of 
troops and arms was much lower there than in Central Europe. Serious inter-
national crises never shook the region. 
In the 1990s—2000s, drastic changes took place in the Baltic Sea area: 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania regained their independence; united Germany 
exerted increased interest on European affairs; NATO grew to incorporate 
Poland (1999), Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (2004); six new members from 
the Baltic region acceded to the European Union (Sweden and Finland in 
1995, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 2004), while Russia became 
the only non-EU state. All countries of the region have acceded to the Coun-
cil of Europe declaring their commitment to common values. They also as-
pired to support the efforts of the OSCE, which resulted in the 1992 Helsinki 
Summit Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
The establishment of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (1992) and the de-
velopment of Russia — EU (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed 
on Corfu un 1994) and Russia — NATO relations (the Founding Act of 1997, 
the 2002 Rome Declaration, etc.) signified positive contributions to the sta-
bilisation of situation in the region. Military activity in the region was insig-
nificant. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1990, 
adapted in 1999) did play a positive role in that period, so the emergence of 
a border shared by a group of EU and NATO members and Russia did not 
change the matters much. The 2008 financial and economic crisis had a less 
significant effect on the Baltic Sea region than it had on Southern Europe 
and the Mediterranean. At some point, however, cooperation between Russia 
and the other Baltic Sea states started to lose its momentum. The EU mem-
ber states were dealing with regional problems without Russian participa-
tion. The Framework Document and the Political Declaration for the North-
ern Dimension (2006) signed by Russia, the EU, Norway, and Iceland were 
both welcomed by the Russian leadership [1], yet the programmes’ practical 
effect was insignificant. In 2007, Russia suspended its involvement in the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [2], a decision affected by 
the stalled ratification by the countries of the West and discontent in the 
‘flank zone limits’, which applied to Russia’s armed forces in the North-
West but not to NATO’s members Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. There 
were a number of other symptoms indicating that the situation was not 
changing for the better. 
Vladimir Putin’s re-election in 2012 opened a new chapter of the Rus-
sian foreign policy. The country’s leadership set a course towards turning 
Russia into one of the centres of a multipolar world, on par with the US. The 
Eurasian Economic Community and the BRICS grouping were to play an 
important role. Russian leadership still strongly believes that these institu-
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tions can come to the fore, putting the ‘historical West’, with its influence 
dwindling, on the sidelines. [3] This led to a confrontation between Russia 
and the West, which, in our opinion, is a clash of institutions rather than civi-
lisations resulting in the acute conflicts in Ukraine and Syria. 
This article is to analyse international relations in the Baltics Sea region 
in the confrontation between Russia and the West, the effect of Ukraine and 
Syria events on this region, and short-term prospects for the region. 
 
1. The effect of Ukraine and Syria crises  
on the situation in the Baltic Sea region 
 
The Ukraine crisis, resulting from tensions between Russia and the West, 
was a strong catalyst of negative trends in international relations in general 
and those in Europe in particular. Its major cause was the rivalry between the 
European Union and the Eurasian Economic Community and Ukraine’s 
choice between the European and Eurasian integration projects. 
The Baltic Sea region was involved in the resulting confrontation be-
tween Russia and the West. The effect of the Ukraine crisis on the region 
was diverse. 
First, the reactions of Russia and the other Baltic Sea states to the Uk-
raine events were completely opposite. Moreover, they supported different 
sides of the conflict. Russian leadership interpreted the overthrow of Presi-
dent Yanukovich as an anti-constitutional coup and they still hold to this po-
sition. [4] Russian ambassador to Kyiv left the city and returned only after 
the presidential election to attend the inauguration of President Poroshenko. 
Other Baltic Sea states acknowledged the change of power in Ukraine as le-
gitimate and continued diplomatic ‘business as usual’. Following the refer-
endum of March 16, 2014, Russia made a decision to incorporate Crimea 
and Sebastopol. [5] Other Baltic Sea states saw it as a violation of interna-
tional law and supported the UN General Assembly resolution on the territo-
rial integrity of Ukraine, which emphasised the invalidity of the referendum. 
[6] The Russian leadership interpreted the Donbass events as an internal con-
flict, whereas other Baltic Sea states accused Russia of intervention. ‘Nor-
mandy talks’ and the Minsk deal were given a positive assessment in Russia. 
However, the EU and NATO members from the Baltic Sea region delegated 
the responsibility for implementing the deal to Russia. It can be thus con-
cluded that Russia and the other states share no common ground on the 
Ukraine crisis. 
This crisis lead to a serious deterioration in the relations between Russia 
and the other Baltic Sea states. The most negative assessment of Russian ac-
tions was given by Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, who compared the situa-
tion with that of the summer of 1940. They were anxious that, in the areas 
with a large population of ethnic Russians, the events might follow the Cri-
mea and Donbass scenario. Of course, part of the Baltic Russian minority 
(especially, non-citizens) agrees with the sentiments of the ‘Russian spring’, 
but by and large such parallels seemed to be unfounded. In the spring of 
2014, the Ukrainian state was going through a deep internal crisis, with some 
of its government completely paralysed. This was not the case in Estonia, 
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Latvia, or Lithuania. For many residents of Crimea and the Donbass, Russia 
was attractive not only for linguistic, cultural, and historical considerations 
but also because of her higher standards of living. The quality of life of the 
Russian minority in the Baltics is much higher than that in the Russian 
North-West. Moreover, most of young ethnic Russians opt for a career in the 
EU. The degree of nostalgia for the Soviet times also differs. The Donbass 
and Crimea used to be privileged territories of the USSR. Donbass miners 
were usually among chairs at Party congresses and other political events. 
They had a right to speak on behalf of the whole country’s working class. 
Donbass miners were constantly glorified by official propaganda as the van-
guard of the Soviet workers (the Stakhanovite movement, etc.). Crimea held 
a less distinguished but still an important position of the ‘all-Union wellness 
resort — it was a popular retreat for Secretaries General of the Central Com-
mittee of CPSU, for instance, Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachev, and 
many other top officials. Russians living in the Baltic republics never had 
such attention. There were a number of other differences, which made the 
repetition of the Ukraine events in the Baltics highly unlikely. 
Anxiety increased with the increasing number of articles and statements 
made by Russian politicians and journalists holding no official positions in 
the government. In April 2015, R. Ishchenko, a former Ukrainian official 
and journalist working at the time in Russian mass media, called for Russia 
to deliver the first strike against the Baltics. “A preventive strike to eliminate 
the Baltic foothold, Ishchenko wrote, can be necessary from the military 
point of view not because someone is expecting an assault from that direc-
tion, but to reduce the length of front-line (be it a virtual one), secure a land 
corridor to the blocked Kaliningrad grouping and liberate the troops that can 
be engaged on other, more important territories”. He also predicted the re-
sults of such actions: “Given technical preservation of status quo, in effect, 
the Baltics will be ruled by pro-Russian forces, the Baltics foreign policy 
will be formulated in Smolenskaya square, and Russian position in negotia-
tions with the West will be strengthened”. [7] Then there were speeches 
given by the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhi-
rinovsky, who demanded that, after Crimea, Russia has to reclaim all territo-
ries that were part of the Russian Empire in 1917 or, at least, those that were 
part of the country as of January 1, 1991. He also declared the independence 
of Poland and Finland illegitimate. [8] 
Certain groups in the West, including the Baltics, have also contributed 
to the growing tension in the region. Western mass media often published 
materials about the impending Russian invasion emphasising that it would 
not draw any serious reaction from either NATO or the EU. Some Baltic 
politicians would hint at the possibility of imposing a blockade on Kalinin-
grad under certain circumstances [9], and so on. In effect, these were at-
tempts to provoke Russia into another conflict, which would push the coun-
try into a more difficult position and result in a confrontation with the West 
at a qualitatively higher level. These information attacks continue today even 
after Western officials have statements stressing that there is not military 
threat to the Baltics coming from Russia. 
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A strident position on Russian politics in Ukraine was adopted by Poland 
and Sweden — the initiators of the Eastern Dimension policy suggesting a 
closer cooperation between Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbai-
jan, and Armenia, on the one hand, and the European Union on the other. 
As the European Union cancelled regular Russia-EU summits and 
NATO suspended cooperation within the Russia-NATO Council, the number 
of contacts between Russia and the other countries of the Baltic Sea region 
dramatically reduced. Summits of the Council of the Baltic Sea States and 
annual Russian-German inter-governmental consultations were cancelled; 
visits of top officials were discontinued (the only exception was Finnish 
President S. Niinistö). 
International organisations of the Baltic Sea States also strongly disap-
proved of Russian policy: they supported resolutions criticising and even 
condemning Russia in the UN General Assembly, Parliamentary Assemblies 
of the Council of Europe, OSCE, NATO, the European Parliament, etc. The 
governing bodies of the EU also fully supported sanctions and restrictions 
against Russia; sometimes their position was rather harsh. 
Thus, the political rift between Russia and the other Baltic Sea states, 
which had been shaping over the previous years, finally became real. 
More pronounced changes took place in the military field. Following 
NATO and EU resolutions, the Baltic Sea States severed all military contacts 
with Russia. Some of them (primarily, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Po-
land) declared Russia a threat to security and asked the US and NATO for 
assistance. President Obama confirmed the US obligations [10], his visits to 
Estonia and Poland in September 2014 being, to a large extent, a declaration. 
Meanwhile, the Baltics, Poland, and some other countries pushed for more, 
i. e. permanent deployment of NATO military facilities and forces. The 
NATO leadership opted for a more moderate solution, choosing to increase 
the number of troops and armaments arriving for manoeuvres and other mili-
tary activities. [11] In 2014—2015, Russia also aspired to strengthen its mili-
tary capabilities, in particular, in the country’s North-West. When reporting 
on the performance of armed forces in 2015, the Russian Defence Minister 
Sergei Shoigu stressed that special attention was paid to Kaliningrad. [12] 
Naval and air forces increased their activities in the border areas and wa-
ters of the Baltic Sea. This raised concerns due to the severance of contacts 
between Russia and NATO, which dramatically increased the threat of air 
incidents, a worry shared by the top military officers of the US. Retired 
Brigadier General Kevin Ryan, former Chief of Staff for the US Army Space 
and Missile Defence Command stated, “the risk of an accident along the Bal-
tic border has become significant… having so many aircraft, warships, and 
troops in the region will eventually lead to an accident”. [13, p. 5] While not 
in the Baltic Sea region, the incident of autumn 2015, when Turkey shot 
down a Russian military aircraft clearly showed the danger of such situations 
and the seriousness of their repercussions. 
In general, one can state that NATO has adopted a policy of ‘soft’ con-
tainment policy towards Russia, and the situation in the military field has 
changed for the worse. Many positive achievements of the past have been 
lost and new concerns contributing to the restoration of the Cold War era 
have emerged. 
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Another important result of the confrontation is the growing rift in values 
fostered by Russia and most of the Baltic Sea region states. In the 1990s, 
Russia and the other Baltic Sea states assumed that they shared common 
values outlined in the documents of the Council of Europe, 1994 Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement, etc. Now propaganda campaigns declare the 
opposite. In our opinion, it is an exaggeration. As well as the other Baltic 
Sea region states, Russia recognises a right to private property and market 
economy (both ideas were completely rejected in the USSR), yet the civili-
zational differences between the countries have grown. 
The major line of confrontation between Russia and the West — in par-
ticular, in the Baltic Sea region, — remains economic. Certain problems 
were observed in the Russian economy as early as 2013 — before the 
Ukraine crisis. They were largely caused by the internal problems of Rus-
sia’s socioeconomic development. In 2014—2015, the problems worsened 
under the influence of external factors — plummeting oil prices and the im-
position of restrictive measures against Russia by the US, EU, and some 
other states in 2014. As a result, Russian economy is facing a crisis de-
scribed by a number of businesspeople and economists as structural. [14] 
Manifestations of the crisis are a decline in production, a plunge in the na-
tional currency value, an increase in unemployment rates, and a decrease in 
standards of living for a significant portion of the population. EU sanctions 
and restrictions against Russia were supported by all the Baltic Sea states, 
including non-EU members Iceland and Norway. The only exception is the 
non-EU Danish territories (the Faroe Islands and Greenland). The Russian 
leadership responded with countersanctions imposed on food imports. [15] 
At this stage, it is difficult to detect which negative effects on the trade 
and economic ties between Russia and the Baltic Sea states are related to the 
sanctions and countersanctions and which — to the other factors. However, 
bilateral trade between Russia and the other Baltic Sea regions dramatically 
reduced. The Baltics and Poland — the countries most affected by the Rus-
sian ban on food imports — sought new markets for their produce. The at-
tempts to find new channels of energy supply became more active. Norway 
was affected by the ban on fish and fish product trade with Russia. The falling 
rouble to euro exchange rate and bans on vacations abroad for members of 
armed forces, police officers, and some other categories delivered a major blow 
to the tourism industry, while the decrease in the number of Russian tourists go-
ing to Finland was especially pronounced. Russian cross-border cooperation 
with the neighbouring states, however, was not significantly affected. 
Forced to recognise the negative effect of the decline in economy and 
trade between Russia and the other Baltic Sea states, one cannot but not note 
that the situation does not differ very much from that with Russia’s other 
economic partners and, therefore, is not extraordinary. 
Cultural, academic, and research connections remained almost intact, 
which is definitely a positive development, although financial problems re-
lating to the falling rouble had a certain effect and some Russian artists and 
scholars, who expressed active support for Russia’s policy in Ukraine, were 
not given visas by the Baltic authorities (which, among other unpleasant 
consequences, was the reason behind a popular Russian music festival leav-
ing its traditional venue in Jūrmala, Latvia). 
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Despite the significant distance between the Baltic Sea and the Middles 
East, the Syrian crisis and Russian involvement in it also had a certain effect 
on the region, albeit much weaker than that of the Ukraine events. The first 
problem faced by the EU member states was the influx of refugees from 
Syria and a number of other countries plagued by longstanding internal con-
flicts. Southern Europe could not contain the crisis, and the number of illegal 
migrants sharply increased in all European states. A common EU policy on 
refugees was long overdue, but its development was stalled by disagree-
ments between the member states. The Baltic Sea states failed to formulate a 
unanimous position on the issue, too. German government supported the 
idea of accepting a significant number of immigrants; this produced a mod-
erate reaction from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. It was the first 
case when the Baltics voiced an opinion different from that dominant in 
European institutions. Sweden, facing a wave of incoming migration, had to 
re-establish controls on the border with Denmark, and Denmark, in its turn, 
introduced similar measures on its border with Germany. The influx of mi-
grants caused several concerns: the need for additional spending, the danger 
of growing disagreements and conflicts of socioeconomic, national, and reli-
gious nature, and the increasing threat of terrorist attacks. After the tragic 
events that took place in Paris in 2015, this aspect was taken with extreme 
seriousness in the relatively peaceful Baltic Sea region. Even greater dis-
agreements were caused by the prospects of cooperating with Russia to fight 
terrorism. The three Baltic States declared that it was completely out of the 
question [16], the Scandinavian countries, Finland, and Poland were also 
fairly sceptical about interactions with Russia, but weren’t so categorical in 
their statements. The dominant opinion in the Baltic Sea states is Russia is 
using Syria and Ukraine for its own purposes (keeping Assad in power and 
strengthening its position in the Ukrainian negotiations, respectively) and 
has no real intention of combating terrorism. All NATO member states, in-
cluding the Baltic Sea countries, supported Turkey in its confrontation with 
Russia. [17] 
The Ukraine and Syria crises caused a rift between Russia and the other 
Baltic Sea states. In effect, regional cooperation with Russia was suspended 
in most areas. 
 
2. Short-term prospects for international relations  
in the Baltic Sea region and Russian policy 
 
The development of international relations in the Baltic Sea region will 
largely depend on general trends in the relations between Russia and the 
West. At best, the situation will improve in the mid-term perspective. There-
fore, only isolated steps and measures easing but not radically changing the 
situation seem to be possible. 
In short-term, several different and at times opposing trends will be ob-
served in the Baltic Sea region. First of all, the role of the US and NATO 
will increase. The US will pay growing attention to the Baltic Sea region, in 
particular, the countries bordering on Russia. This will hold true for all fields — 
economy, politics, military affairs, etc. At the 2015 NATO summit in War-
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saw, significant attention will be undoubtedly paid to NATO presence in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics. It is worth stressing that the cur-
rent Polish leadership gravitates towards the US and NATO rather than the 
EU. Poland’s new Minister of National Defence A. Macierewicz raised the 
issues of permanent deployment of NATO troops in the country. [18] Poland 
and Lithuania will develop both bilateral and multilateral military coopera-
tion with Ukraine. The question of acceding to NATO will be constantly 
raised in Finland and Sweden. The organisational and technical details of 
their accession can be settled rather rapidly. However, unless the Ukraine 
situation sharply deteriorates or a new hotspot of tension emerges in Europe, 
Sweden and Finland will not accede to NATO. Prime Ministers of Sweden 
S. Löfven and Finland J. Sipilä voice these ideas in their recent article. Both 
politicians stress that Finland and Sweden are outside military alliances, but 
this position does not suggest isolationism. Both countries will develop mili-
tary cooperation with each other and interact with international organisations 
maintaining close partnership with NATO and a high level of transatlantic 
relations. [19] 
The following years will be a difficult period for the European Union. It 
seems it will go through deep internal transformations. Reaching a consensus 
by all member states will not be an easy task. The UK will most likely re-
main in the EU. However, Brexit will raise serious concerns among the 
European political and business elites. The Baltic Sea states also have differ-
ent views on the future of the EU. Sweden, Denmark, and (in the short-term 
perspective) Poland do not plan to replace their national currencies with the 
euro. The countries of the EU and especially the Baltic Sea region will adjust 
their energy policy in line with the EU objectives to diversify energy supply 
and reduce monopolism in the European energy market (the Third Energy 
Package). The EU opportunities are increasing in this respect. Falling oil 
prices are a favourable factor for the EU member states in the Baltic Sea re-
gion. Moreover, they will also benefit from the aspiration of Saudi Arabia to 
enter the European market, where the country did not have a strong presence 
earlier. Russia’s Minister of Energy A. Novak was right to note that it will 
result in a steep increase in competition. [20] It is very likely that Iran, after 
the sanctions against the country will have been lifted in January 2016, will 
also export oil to Europe, which will result in a more dramatic reduction in 
oil prices. The situation in the gas market is more complicated. Germany has 
approved the construction of Nord Stream-2. This can make the country not 
only the largest purchaser of Russian gas but also a hub for most European 
countries. Due to different reasons, this prospect is not welcomed by Italy 
and some other states, including the Baltics. The latter believe that Ger-
many’s decision does not take into account their interests and contradicts the 
spirit of anti-Russian sanctions. The discussion of Nord Stream-2 is increas-
ingly fuelled by political rather than economic considerations. The Baltics 
announce plans to end their dependence on Russian gas. While they put their 
hopes into liquefied natural gas supplies, it is unlikely that the Baltics will 
fully implement this plan. Some technical issues remain unresolved and the 
price for LNG is rather high. However, this gives the Baltic Sea states pur-
chasing Russian gas an opportunity to demand better deals. Just like in the 
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oil market, competition is increasing. In the mid-term perspective, the Baltic 
Sea region will strive to create a pipeline and communications system with-
out Russian participation. Nevertheless, the prospects of securing EU funds 
required for such ambitious project are rather limited. 
A lot will depend on whether President Obama pushes the founding 
document of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership through. 
There is little information on the relevant negotiations. However, the estab-
lishment of the TTIP can cause a deeper rift between the EU member states 
in the Baltic Sea region and the Russian North-West. 
In the near future, one can expect China to be increasingly active in the 
Baltic Sea region. Despite serious economic problems, China is unlikely to 
abandon the new Silk Road project. In one of the versions, it runs through 
Poland and Lithuania. The Chinese are also looking for partnerships with the 
other Baltic Sea region states. China pays special attention to modern infra-
structure and logistics. Recently, Beijing has been increasingly interested in 
developing multilateral cooperation with former socialist states of Central 
and Eastern Europe in the 16+1 format. In November 2015, the 6th China 
CEE summit took place in Suzhou. The summit culminated in the publica-
tion of the mid-term plan for cooperation between China and CEE countries 
and the Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and 
Eastern European countries. All summit participants supported the Chinese 
proposals. Central and Eastern European countries affirmed commitment to 
positive bilateral partnership for harmonising development strategies with 
China, developing new cooperation models, and expanding mutually benefi-
cial cooperation in politics, economy, and humanitarian initiatives. [21] The 
next summit will take place in 2016 in Latvia. 
At the same time, China also strives to develop bilateral contacts with 
the Baltic Sea states. Beijing is very pragmatic and committed to promoting 
its own interests. For instance, the Chinese leadership often meets with top 
officials of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — the countries that have rather 
strained relations with Russia. The 2015 China-Latvia summit resulted in an 
agreement on air service between Riga and Chengdu to increase the number 
of tourists. Opportunities for launching joint transport projects were dis-
cussed. [22] China’s share in the total trade of the Baltic Sea states is not 
high today, but it is expected to grow in the near future. One cannot exclude 
that, one day, Chinese cargo traffic will replace that from Russia in some 
Baltic ports. A proof of the seriousness of China’s intentions is that the Beijing 
Foreign Studies University trains specialists with a command of languages 
of all Baltic Sea states. [23] 
Therefore, during the next few years we will see an increase in the number 
of actors in the Baltic Sea region, whereas the factors affecting the develop-
ment of international relations in the region will become more diversified. Of 
course, this will have a certain effect on Russian policy in the region. 
In the same period, Russian foreign policy in the region will need to fo-
cus on preventing the weakening of its position and creating prerequisites for 
its strengthening in the short-term perspective. 
First of all, Russia has to do everything possible to prevent a conflict in 
the Baltic Sea region. Russia is now de facto involved in several conflicts, 
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including one in the vicinity of its southern borders. Another conflict would 
adversely affect Russian international position, as well as the political and 
socioeconomic situation in the country. There are no internal reasons for an 
international crisis in the Baltic Sea region. Despite the increasing tension, 
the situation remains stable. However, international relations in the region 
can be destabilised by conflicts raging far beyond its borders. 
Russian relations with NATO and the EU are likely to remain at the cur-
rent or slightly higher level in the short-term perspective. One should not 
expect a resumption of a large-scale dialogue with the Baltic Sea region 
states either in the format of the Council of the Baltic Sea States or on a bi-
lateral basis at the level of heads of state. Individual meetings on urgent is-
sues are likely to take place. Most probably, EU sanctions and restrictive 
measures will not be lifted, yet they can be reduced if a complete ceasefire 
holds in Donbass. However, even in the most favourable situation — if the 
Minsk deal holds and sectoral sanctions are lifted — the restoration of eco-
nomic ties will take some time. A turn to cooperation will be neither simple 
nor easy. 
It thus seems logical to adjust Russian westward policy in its part con-
cerning the Baltic affairs. Due to the increasing presence in the US, it would 
be useful to discuss the problems of regional security at Russia-US negotia-
tions as a separate item on the agenda. Russia-US negotiations can play an 
important role in the deployment of US missile defence elements in the re-
gion, which draws sharp criticism from Russia. As to the dialogue with the 
EU, it will be reasonable to be very cautious. The EU is facing a period of 
transformations accompanied by internal disagreements. One can still claim 
with a high degree of certainty that this will not result in the Union’s disinte-
gration. Nevertheless, most members of the European political and business 
elite will be very sensitive to any external attempts — regardless of their ori-
gin — to take advantage of these disagreements. Since the migrant problem 
will be one of the central for European states, it would be logical if Russia 
provided certain support (for instance, stopping the transit of migrants across 
the Russian border, etc.). 
Significant tension between Russia and the other Baltic Sea states brings 
back the dilemma of whether Russia has to improve relations in politics and 
the military field or focus on progress in economy, environmental protection, 
education, science, and culture and only later turn to military and political 
problems. It seems that, in the current conditions, it will be more advisable 
to opt for the latter in the Baltic Sea region. Another important factor is the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Unlike the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, whose economic ties with Russia are rather insignificant, the 
TTIP will include the EU — Russia’s largest trade partner. Therefore, re-
fusal to improve relations with these countries will have an adverse effect on 
Russian economy. By all estimates, economic growth rates in all the EU 
member states of the Baltic Sea region will be much higher than in Russia. 
The existing disproportion in the levels of socioeconomic development will 
increase. The Baltic Sea region and Russian North-West (especially Saint 
Petersburg as the largest regional city and Kaliningrad due to its geographi-
cal position) could play a positive role in maintaining and, later, developing 
cooperation across the Baltic Sea region. 
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In the energy market of the Baltic Sea region, Russia will have to face 
increasing competition. Most probably, none of the region’s states will be 
able to give up Russia’s energy. However, the emergence of Saudi and, pos-
sibly, Iranian oil cannot but result in a reduction in prices, which will have a 
painful effect on the Russian budget. Moreover, repercussions of sanctions 
and restrictive measures imposed by the West against the Russian oil indus-
try may become more pronounced. Competition will also grow in the gas 
industry. In these conditions, problems of developing trade and economic 
partnerships in areas that are not affected by restrictive measures, sanctions, 
and countersanctions are of increasing importance. Small and medium enter-
prises can play a significant role in rectifying the situation. [24] Since they 
are very sensitive to the economic instability in Russia and the dangers of 
deteriorating international situation, they can only do so with considerable 
support from the Government of the Russian Federation and the European 
Commission. However, one should not underestimate the existing positive 
experience in environmental protection. 
Maintaining and developing ties in the humanitarian sector could also 
have a positive effect. In particular, developing cooperation and contacts be-
tween universities, schools, and cultural institutions could also contribute to 
the improvement of the general situation. 
 
*** 
 
Despite the ‘turn to the East’ that took place during the confrontation 
with the West, the Euro-Atlantic line of Russian foreign policy will remain a 
priority. In view of crises and spots of tension on the southern flank (con-
flicts with Ukraine and Turkey, threat of terrorism associated with the Is-
lamic State, which is officially banned in Russia), stability in the Baltic Sea 
region will serve both short- and long-term interests of Russia. An active 
foreign policy aimed at using any cooperation opportunities and securing 
progress wherever possible would contribute to maintaining the country’s 
current position in the short-term perspective and strengthening it in the 
framework of multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the Baltic Sea states 
in mid-term. Such cooperation can become one of the factors contributing to 
the improvement of relations between Russia and the West in the mid-term 
perspective. 
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